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Abstract
This contribution places the provisions of the Treaty creating
a free trade area and customs union between the Member
States (Articles 28-31 TFEU) in their wider context. It then
focuses on the interpretation of Article 30 in the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
Throughout, it casts sideways glances at corresponding pro-
visions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
As it turns out, the abolition of customs duties and charges
having equivalent effect, and the establishment of a cus-
toms union between Member States, were important mile-
stones in the development of European unification. They
became overshadowed later by more spectacular develop-
ments in the case law on the free movement of goods, per-
sons and services. As a consequence, the importance of the
customs provisions is widely underrated. Brexit concentrates
the minds in this respect, as an important economy is about
to rearrange and even recreate the basic building blocks of
its international trading relations.
Keywords: free trade area, EU Customs Union, internal mar-
ket, European Union, Brexit
1 Introduction
Articles 28 to 31 Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) are located at the very begin-
ning of the Treaty’s chapter on the four freedoms of the
internal market. While Article 28(1) TFEU in the
version of the Lisbon Treaty somewhat blandly says
that the Union shall ‘comprise’ a customs union, the
wording until 2009 was that Community shall be ‘based
upon’ a customs union (Article 23 TEC). This formula-
tion and its prominent position highlighted that the cus-
toms provisions had a fundamental importance, a pio-
neering function for the subsequent realisation of the
other freedoms. Testimony to this is also the fact that
the abolition of customs duties between Member States,
and the establishment of the customs union vis-à-vis
third countries, was accomplished for industrial prod-
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ucts in mid-1968, well before the end of the transitional
period on 31 December 1969.1
The early start also meant that the most important legal
questions were resolved early on. Since the period of the
rapid unfolding of the case law between, roughly, 1968
and the mid-1970s, there were no more dramatic devel-
opments, but only incremental refinement. As a conse-
quence, there are no controversies about the interpreta-
tion of the provisions that are not too obscure to warrant
a discussion in the limited space available here.2 Related
to this, Articles 28-31 are the wallflowers of the scholar-
ship, and as it would seem, at least anecdotally, of aca-
demic teaching on the free movement of goods. The fol-
lowing offers reflections on the background and context
of Articles 28-31, as well as a synthesis of the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) regarding their interpretation.
This sounds like a moderate ambition. It derives its rele-
vance, however, from the impending departure (barring
some unforeseen and tumultuous development in the
meantime) of the United Kingdom from the European
Union (EU). One important desire of those promoting
‘Brexit’ is to regain for ‘Global Britain’ the freedom to
1. The schedule for abolition of customs duties between Member States,
and for the establishment of the common customs tariff, was last con-
tained in Arts 7 and 14-24 EC after the 1992 Maastricht amendments,
then removed by the amendments following the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam.
2. Some commentaries and textbooks covering Arts 28-30 TFEU are:
Arnull and Chalmers, The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law,
2015; Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, 6th ed. 2019; Barnard
and Peers, European Union Law, 2nd ed. 2017; Calliess and Ruffert,
EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016; Chalmers, Davies & Monti, European Union
Law, 3rd ed. 2014; Craig and de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases, and
Materials, 6th ed. 2015; Dashwood, Dougan, Rodger, Spaventa &
Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 6th ed. 2011;
Dauses and Ludwigs, Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts, loose-leaf,
last updated January 2019; Ehlermann, Bieber & Haag, Handbuch des
Europäischen Rechts, loose-leaf, last updated March 2019; Geiger,
Khan & Kotzur, EUV/AEUV, Vertrag über die Europäische Union und
Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, 6th ed. 2017;
Gormley, EU Law of Free Movement of Goods and Customs Union,
2009; Grabitz, Hilf & Nettesheim, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 3
vols, loose-leaf, last updated June 2019; v.d. Groeben, Schwarze &
Hatje, Kommentar zu EUV, AEUV und GRCh, 4 vols, 7th ed. 2015; Kili-
an/Wendt, Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, 6th ed. 2017; Lyons, Euro-
pean Customs Law, 2018; Pechstein, Nowak & Häde, Frankfurter Kom-
mentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV, 2017; Schwarze, Becker, Hatje &
Schoo, EU-Kommentar, 4th ed. 2019; Streinz, EUV/AEUV, Kommentar,
3rd ed. 2018; Weatherill, Cases & Materials on EU Law, 12th ed. 2016,
all with further references to specialist literature.
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stride out into the world and conclude trade agreements
with any countries it likes, on terms that it chooses,
without being hemmed in by the political and legal com-
promises that the UK had to accept in this respect as a
Member State of the EU. Many of the claims made in
this respect, however, turn out to be fantastical because
they are devoid of even a basic understanding of the
concepts fundamental to international trade in general,
and intra-EU trade in particular. These concepts are:
free trade area, customs union and internal market.
They will first be explained in the following, before the
interpretation of Article 30 TFEU is brought into focus.
2 The Stages of Economic
Integration in the Internal
Market
The context of the prohibition of customs duties and
charges having equivalent effect is the creation of the
internal market, described in Article 26(2) TFEU as an
‘area without internal frontiers’ to the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital (the ‘four free-
doms’). The economic integration between the Member
States thus covers all sectors of their economies. From
the perspective of the four freedoms, the Member States
are seen as markets, and as the several legal systems that
govern economic transactions taking place on each of
these markets.
In order to integrate the national markets, the Treaty
tackles different kinds of ‘frontiers’, all understood as
legal obstacles to economic exchange across the persist-
ing political and geographical borders. The most funda-
mental distinction is that between financial (or tariff-)3
barriers and non-financial (or technical) barriers to
trade. The Treaty articles discussed below contribute to
the dismantling of fiscal barriers; that is, they bring
about financial neutrality in trade between Member
States.
Transport costs will inevitably increase as goods are
shipped farther afield, especially into other Member
States. This cannot be helped by any sort of legal rules.
Nevertheless, the fiscal burdens on transactions crossing
the borders to and from other Member States (i.e. those
burdens imposed by national law, rather than those aris-
ing naturally from geographical distance) must not be
graver than those taking place within one and the same
Member State.4
3. The Court, largely synonymously, uses the term ‘fiscal’ barriers. This
places somewhat more emphasis on the origin of the barrier in a
demand for payment made under public law by a Member State, or by
a body authorised by the state to collect money from exporters or
importers.
4. Case C-206/06 Essent Netwerk Noord, ECLI:EU:C:2008:413, para. 60:
‘Articles [30 and 110 TFEU] seek to preserve the free movement of
goods and competition between domestic products and imported prod-
ucts.’
The Court, accordingly, sees two justifications for the
prohibition of customs duties and charges having equiv-
alent effect: first, they artificially increase the price of
imported or exported goods in relation to domestic
products;5 secondly, the free movement of goods is fur-
ther aggravated by the resulting administrative formali-
ties.6
Financial- and non-financial barriers are not only con-
ceptually distinct but they also stand for different modes
of integration coexisting under the Treaty: free trade
area, customs union, internal market.7 These can be
described as ‘layers’, to capture their simultaneous pur-
suit by the Treaty. In this view, Articles 28-30 would
appear as the most basic: a simple prohibition without
exceptions and, correspondingly, no need (or even pos-
sibility) to adopt harmonising legislation:8 national cus-
toms duties and charges having equivalent effect
become illegal and, eventually, simply disappear. Alter-
natively, one can speak of ‘stages’ of integration to
emphasise that they have historic precursors and were
(and still are) realised to varying extents at different
times, in and between different countries.
A free trade area, at its simplest, involves no more than
the reduction or even abolition of customs duties and of
quantitative restrictions.9 In the EU, this is the task of
Articles 28(1) and 30 – adding a prohibition of charges
having equivalent effect to customs duties – as well as of
the first alternative of Article 34.10 The promise to liber-
alise trade is made, however, only between the partici-
pating states, not to (or with regard to) third countries.
The participating states remain free to adopt independ-
5. Case C-209/89 Commission v. Italy (Out of hours-fees), ECLI:EU:C:
1991:139, para. 7; Case C-65/16 Istanbul Lojistik, ECLI:EU:C:
2017:770, para. 39.
6. Cases 63/74 Cadsky, ECLI:EU:C:1975:33, para. 4; 46/76 Bauhuis,
ECLI:EU:C:1977:6, para. 9; C-389/00 Commission v. Germany (Solidar-
ity fund), ECLI:EU:C:2003:111, para. 22; C-254/13 Orgacom,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2251, para. 22; C-5/14 Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:354, para. 87.
7. (Economic and) Monetary union may be added, but will be left out of
consideration in the text above, not least because not all Member States
have adopted the common currency.
8. This simplification is not meant to deny that quantitative restrictions
(quota) are not governed by Articles 28-30 but by Articles 34 and 35
and that they are therefore capable of justification under Article 36,
which is unavailable for charges that come under Article 30: Cases
C-441/98 Mikhaïlidis, ECLI:EU:C:2000:479, para. 14; C-173/05 Com-
ission v. Italy (Gas pipelines), ECLI:EU:C:2007:362, para. 42; Istanbul
Lojistik (n5), para. 41.
9. See the definition in GATT 1947/1994 (full text under https://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm), Art. XXIV(8)
(b): ‘A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regula-
tions of commerce … are eliminated on substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories in products originating in such terri-
tories.’
10. Similarly under GATT 1947/1994 (n9), Art. XI(1), ‘No prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures,
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the impor-
tation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party’, and duties shall be reduced
through negotiations pursuant to Art. II, with the reductions conceded
to the most favoured nation to be extended, in principle, to all other
contracting parties, Art. I(1).
220
ELR 2019 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000138
ent trade policies vis-à-vis third countries. As a conse-
quence, third countries’ traders who want to market
their goods in a participating state with high tariffs will
route their products through the participating state with
the lowest possible tariffs. (The cost of transport to the
target state from the state with the lowest tariff in abso-
lute terms might be prohibitive.)
Because separate and different external tariffs remain
permissible to the participants in a free trade area, each
state is within its rights to defend its chosen tariffs on
imports from third countries. A free trade area will
therefore need rules of origin to determine which goods
benefit from the mutual promises and which do not.
These rules will need policing, implemented through
border controls. Trade between the states participating
in a mere free trade area will, therefore, never be entire-
ly free: the financial barriers may be gone, but not the
physical ones. The most important contemporary exam-
ple of a mere free trade area is the one between the
USA, Mexico and Canada.
Border controls are needed, as we have seen, to patrol
separate, national external tariffs. These controls
become redundant if there are no longer any such tar-
iffs. The next step up in economic integration is, hence,
the adoption of one set of tariffs that applies to all par-
ticipating states in their trade with third countries. Once
the countries of the free trade area have adopted such a
single tariff, they form a customs union.11 This makes
rules of origin redundant and shifts all necessary finan-
cial controls to the external borders of the participating
states, removing them from the borders between them.12
An historic example of a customs union is the German
Zollverein of 1834; currently, there exists only one per-
manent customs union between sizeable, developed
countries, namely the EU.13 In the EU, a customs union
is realised by the adoption of the Common Customs
Tariff on the basis of Article 31 TFEU.
Even in a customs union, however, trade is not entirely
free. This is because only financial restrictions and quo-
ta are addressed. The next step up from a customs
union is, therefore, the reduction or abolition of the
much more numerous non-financial barriers. This leads
to the creation of an internal market. As far as goods are
concerned, the EU seeks to achieve this aim through the
prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions on imports, exports and goods
11. See the definition in GATT 1947/1994 (n9), Art. XXIV(8)(a): ‘A customs
union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories …’.
12. Similarly to what the Court found in n4, it held with regard to the Com-
mon Customs Tariff that the latter ‘is intended to achieve an equalisa-
tion of customs charges levied at the borders of the Community on
products imported from non-member countries, in order to avoid any
[deflection of trade in relations with those countries and] distortion of
free internal circulation or of competitive conditions’, Case 266/81
SIOT, ECLI:EU:C:1983:77, para. 18; without the text in square brackets,
but otherwise identical in Gas pipelines (n8), ECLI:EU:C:2007:362,
para. 29.
13. The customs union between Turkey and the EU is meant to be a staging
post on Turkey’s way to eventual membership of the EU; as this pros-
pect (currently) fades, that customs union becomes more durable than
originally envisaged.
in transit, Articles 34-36, and harmonising EU legisla-
tion adopted under Article 114 TFEU.
The geographical reach of the internal market between
the Member States is extended by the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) Agreement. Under this agreement,
the EU grants the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) states, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway,
access to its single market, and the latter reciprocate by
allowing access to their markets and by making financial
contributions.14 They do not, however, participate in
the political integration of the single market, i.e. in the
creation of harmonised or uniform supranational law for
the internal market. There is also no customs union
between the EU and non-EU EEA states.15
Against this background, Article 30 stands out as the
bedrock of economic integration in the EU. Most of the
fundamental questions pertaining to its interpretation
came before the Court of Justice between the late 1960s
and the mid-1970s. Since then Articles 34, 45, 49, 56
and 63 TFEU have overtaken it in terms of attention, as
manifested in the number of cases that come before the
Court. Nevertheless, as much as the realisation of Arti-
cle 30 was the first step towards the internal market, the
provision will remain applicable to goods imported into
the EU, and then moving between Member States, from
the post-Brexit UK.
3 The Scope of Article 30
TFEU
The provisions of the Treaty that are relevant here,
Articles 28-30 TFEU, open the title on ‘Free movement
of goods’. Article 28 stipulates, accordingly, that the
customs union ‘shall cover all trade in goods’. The first
question when clarifying the scope of the provision is,
therefore, the meaning of ‘goods’. The Court of Justice
of the European Union (the Court) defined goods as
physical objects that can be valued in money and that
can be the subject of commercial transactions.16
The origin of the goods is immaterial. Article 30 applies
without further to goods made, assembled or refined in
the Member States. Article 28(2) extends the benefit of
Articles 30-37 TFEU (‘Chapter 3 of this Title’) to
goods coming from third countries that are in free circu-
lation in Member States. Article 29 defines when goods
are in free circulation, viz. when they have undergone
customs clearance in accordance with the Common
14. Apart from their financial contribution to the EU budget, see https://
eeagrants.org for a list of programmes financed directly by Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway in poorer EU Member States.
15. For a brief overview of the contents of the EEA Agreement, see
www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features#1.
16. Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy (Art treasures), ECLI:EU:C:1968:51,
p. 428 of the English version of the European Court Reports. Neverthe-
less, electricity is also covered, Essent Netwerk Noord (n4), para. 40,
and the categorisation as ‘goods’ is independent of the intrinsic value of
the goods: even waste shipped for disposal is encompassed by the con-
cept of goods, Case C-221/06 Frohnleiten, ECLI:EU:C:2007:657, paras.
37, 38.
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Customs Tariff. An example of goods in free circulation
can be found in the seminal case on Article 34, Dasson-
ville,17 concerning Scotch Whiskey. Articles 28(2) and
29 will come to renewed prominence following the
departure of the United Kingdom from the EU.
The shift in the wording between ‘goods’ in Article
28(1) to ‘products’ in Articles 28(2) and 29 and back to
‘goods’ in Article 36 has no substantive consequences.
As Article 32(c) indicates, the free movement of goods is
concerned with raw materials as well as with semi-fin-
ished and finished goods.
The prohibition of Article 30 applies to ‘customs duties
and charges having equivalent effect’. A customs duty is
simply any demand for payment that is labelled a cus-
toms duty, made on the occasion of goods crossing a
frontier between Member States.18 More conceptual
sophistication is not required: all other dues can (Article
110 notwithstanding) still be charges having equivalent
effect to customs duties. This complementarity between
the two concepts is meant to prevent any gaps in the
removal of financial barriers to trade between Member
States.19
The Court developed the definition of ‘charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties’ in its judgement in
an action brought by the Commission against Italy.
That Member State had imposed a levy on all goods
crossing its frontiers in either direction. The money was
said to be the quid pro quo for making customs statistics
compiled by the Italian authorities available to importers
and exporters.20 The statistics purportedly allowed
these traders ‘to determine precisely the actual move-
ments of goods and, consequently, changes [in] the state
of the market’. The exactness of the information, more-
over, ‘afford[ed] importers a better competitive position
in the Italian market whilst exporters enjoy[ed] a similar
advantage abroad’.21 As a consequence, the Italian gov-
ernment argued, the levy did not constitute a charge
having equivalent effect to a customs duty.
17. Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville,
ECLI:EU:C:1974:82.
18. This follows a contrario from the element ‘whatever its designation’ in
the Court’s definition of a charge having equivalent effect to a customs
duty (below d)): if a monetary burden is not called (‘designated’) a cus-
toms duty, it will be a charge having equivalent effect (provided the
other elements of the definition are also present).
19. Joined Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Diamantarbeiders, ECLI:EU:C:1969:30,
paras. 15-18: ‘The extension of the prohibition of customs duties to
charges having equivalent effect is intended to supplement the prohi-
bition against obstacles to trade created by such duties by increasing its
efficiency. The use of these two complementary concepts thus tends, in
trade between member states, to avoid the imposition of any pecuniary
charge on goods circulating within the [EU] by virtue of the fact that
they cross a national frontier’; likewise in Case 87/75 Bresciani
ECLI:EU:C:1976:18, para. 8/9.
20. The Italian government here invoked, in so many words, what it would
have been allowed to do under Art. VIII of GATT 1947/1994 (n9): ‘4.
The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities
and requirements imposed by governmental authorities in connection
with importation and exportation, including those relating to: … (e)
statistical services; …’
21. Case 24/68 Commission v. Italy (Statistical levy), ECLI:EU:C:1969:29,
para. 15.
The Court found otherwise based on its understanding
of a charge having equivalent effect:
any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its
designation and mode of application, which is
imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by
reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which
is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a
charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of
[Article 30 TFEU], even if it is not imposed for the
benefit of the state, is not discriminatory or protec-
tive in effect and if the product on which the charge
is imposed is not in competition with any domestic
product.22
The elements of this definition will be successively elu-
cidated below.
4 ‘Any Pecuniary Charge’
The emphasis in this first element of the definition is on
‘any’, to which the Court adds, ‘however small’. In
other words, the amount demanded is immaterial. It is
ultimately the administrative formalities entailed by its
collection that hinder trade.23 Such hindrance goes
against the very idea of the internal market as ‘an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement
of goods … is ensured’, as Article 26(2) TFEU puts it.24
The detrimental effect on trade also explains why Arti-
cle 30 applies likewise to para-fiscal charges, that is,
those paid under a legal obligation to a private or auton-
omous public body.25
Articles 34 and 35 TFEU (the prohibition of quantita-
tive restrictions and measures having equivalent effect),
by contrast, apply to non-pecuniary burdens, that is,
(typically) to controls. In practice, these burdens ought
to be assessed first: if the controls are illegal, so must the
charges therefor be. (If the control is permissible, the
charge is still lawful only if it constitutes taxation; see
below.)26
22. Statistical levy (n21), para. 9; see, most recently, Cases C-76/17 Petro-
tel-Lukoil, ECLI:EU:C:2018:139, para. 21; C-39/17 Lubrizol France,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:438, para. 24.
23. See in and by n6.
24. Case 132/82 Commission v. Belgium (Customs warehouses),
ECLI:EU:C:1983:135, para. 9: ‘The prohibition of charges having an
effect equivalent to customs duties, laid down in provisions of the Trea-
ty, is justified on the ground that pecuniary charges imposed by reason
or on the occasion of the crossing of the frontier represent an obstacle
to the free movement of goods.’
25. Case 94/74 Industria Gomma Articoli Vari (IGAV), ECLI:EU:C:1975:81,
para. 11: ‘the fact that a duty is levied by an independent institution
governed by public law rather than levied by the state itself and is used
by that institution for purposes intended by the relevant legislation
involves no difference with regard to the possible definition of that fis-
cal charge as a charge having an effect equivalent to customs duties,
since the prohibition under Article [30, 2nd sentence] attaches solely to
the effect of such charges and not to the manner in which they are
imposed’; Essent Netwerk Noord (n4), para. 46: charge payable to the
operators of networks for the distribution of electricity.
26. Case 32/80 Kortmann, ECLI:EU:C:1981:20, paras. 11, 12. For an exam-
ple, see Case 158/82 Comission v. Denmark (Groundnuts), ECLI:EU:C:
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5 ‘Imposed’
The charge must be ‘imposed’, that is, authoritatively
and unconditionally demanded.
An authoritative and unconditional demand implies that
there is compulsion brought to bear on the importer or
exporter. This element of compulsion is absent where
the charge is ‘consideration for a service actually ren-
dered’.27 This in turn requires a specific benefit for
individual traders. In fact, however, the case law does
not contain a single example of the Court’s finding ‘ser-
vices’ to have been ‘actually rendered’, and the trader
having paid therefor in discharge of a contractual obliga-
tion voluntarily undertaken. This element of the defini-
tion is in reality mere lip service, a polite put-down of
the Italian government’s defence in Statistical levy. The
involuntary and inescapable nature of the situation in
which the ‘service’ is rendered (and payment demand-
ed) excludes its counting as a ‘benefit’. The Court
quotes the ‘consideration …’ formula as often (namely,
every time) as it finds that the traders in question have
not received any service that could prevent their pay-
ment in return for being qualified as a charge having
equivalent effect to a customs duty.
Nevertheless, just to be certain one might want to run
through the test as set out by the Court. The first ques-
tion is whether the trader(s) have received a ‘benefit’.
This translates into whether they would otherwise have
procured the service on the open market, voluntarily
rather than nolens volens. This will never be the case
where the trader(s) merely took up whatever relief the
customs authorities or others on their behalf offered
while the traders complied with any import formali-
ties.28 No benefit is market access itself: this is every
importer’s and exporter’s right under the Treaty, which
1983:317, where the health inspections in issue were legal, but the way
they were financed amounted to charges having equivalent effect to
customs duties.
27. Statistical levy (n21), para. 11; Solidarity fund (n6), para. 23. – The
wording is apparently gleaned from Art. II of GATT 1947/1994 (n9): ‘2.
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from impos-
ing at any time on the importation of any product: … (c) fees or other
charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered’ (emphasis
added). Only once products have been imported is it that they, ‘shall
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to
like domestic products.’
28. See, e.g., Customs warehouses (n24), para. 13: ‘Whilst it is true that the
use of a public warehouse in the interior of the country offers certain
advantages to importers it seems clear first of all that such advantages
are linked solely with the completion of customs formalities which,
whatever the place, is always compulsory. It should moreover be noted
that such advantages result from the scheme of Community transit, …
in order to increase the fluidity of the movement of goods and to facili-
tate transport within the [EU]. There can therefore be no question of
levying any charges for customs clearance facilities accorded in the
interests of the common market’, and similarly in Case C-16/94 Dubois,
ECLI:EU:C:1995:268, para. 18. For another vivid illustration, see Case
39/82 Donner, ECLI:EU:C:1983:3, para. 11: ‘[T]he postal administra-
tion’s argument to the effect that a private individual may refuse to
accept delivery, send the postman and the parcel away and make a
declaration himself which would entail cancelling the declaration
already made by the postal administration, would seem to ignore the
realities of daily life.’
they can vindicate in the national courts.29 It is not a
privilege granted at whim by the Member State, and as
easily denied or withdrawn by that state.
If there is a benefit at all, it must be ‘specific’, i.e. meas-
urable. It must be possible to attach an approximate
monetary figure to it.30 The charge must be in propor-
tion to that figure. The criteria for gauging the propor-
tionality of the consideration can be gleaned from the
limits that apply to the extent to which Member States
may recoup administrative expenses for mandatory
inspections (see below). Whether the Member State, or
an authorised private organisation acting on its behalf,
can be allowed a profit margin on top will have to be
assessed under the EU rules on state aid and on public
procurement; here is not the place for a detailed discus-
sion.
The specific benefit must finally also be ‘individual’. It
must accrue to one or several traders in and because of
the circumstances in which they find themselves. It is
not enough that they come to enjoy the benefit only as a
member of a group.31 (One might think, by way of anal-
ogy, of a movie shown on an overhead monitor during
the flight on a plane: this is not shown to any one indi-
vidual passenger, but to all in the round.) Equally insuf-
ficient is a benefit to the general public, as in the case of
health checks.32 Such controls must be financed out of
general taxation. Their costs cannot be rolled over to
traders. Individual traders might well be spared liability
for any faulty products that had been spotted during
controls. This is, however, a mere reflex, and sufficient-
ly remunerated by the traders’ contributing to the gen-
eral tax revenue.
6 ‘Unilaterally by a Member
State’
The element of the definition that asks whether the
charge has been imposed unilaterally by a Member State
translates into the question of whether any controls for
which the charge was levied are mandatory under EU
29. Joined cases C-277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91 Ligur Carni,
ECLI:EU:C:1993:927, para. 39.
30. Cadsky (n6), para. 6.
31. See, e.g., Statistical levy (n21), para. 16: ‘The statistical information in
question is beneficial to the economy as a whole and inter alia to the
relevant administrative authorities. Even if the competitive position of
importers and exporters were to be particularly improved as a result, the
statistics still constitute an advantage so general, and so difficult to
assess, that the disputed charge cannot be regarded as the considera-
tion for a specific benefit actually conferred’; and Cadsky (n6), para. 8:
‘Even if the maintenance of the reputation of fruit and vegetable prod-
ucts of a member state by the indirect expedient of a certificate of
inspection and the affixing of a national export stamp is capable of
encouraging exports of national products, this benefit relates to the
general interest of all exporters, so that the individual interest of each of
them is so ill-defined that a charge imposed in payment for this inspec-
tion cannot be regarded as consideration for a specific benefit actually
and individually conferred’; Solidarity fund (n6), para. 36.
32. Bresciani (n19), para. 10.
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law.33 If the Member States must, under EU law, carry
out the controls, they may recoup their administrative
expenses, and it does in that regard not matter for the
legality of each Member State’s charges that some
Member States have decided not to recoup the expenses
from traders, but to finance them out of general reve-
nue.34 Once the products have passed muster, they can
move throughout the internal market without any repe-
tition of the same controls. These charges, therefore, do
not hinder free trade but enable it. They give all Mem-
ber States into which the product is imported subse-
quently the confidence that it has been tested in accord-
ance with common rules. What is more, all Member
States have participated in the adoption of these rules by
the EU’s legislative institutions. If Member States ‘went
it alone’, the number of controls would inevitably multi-
ply, and free trade would become illusory.
Nevertheless, if a Member State has legitimately decid-
ed to finance the controls through fees levied on traders,
these fees must not yield a profit for the Member
State.35 There must, in other words, be a direct link
between the charge and the costs that the Member State
has incurred for the controls.36 This element in the
Court’s jurisprudence is an echo of the general principle
of proportionality, applicable whenever the Member
States implement EU law: the financial burden imposed
on a trader by a Member State must not go further than
is necessary for the Member State’s complying with its
obligations under EU law.
Permissible criteria for calculating the fees are, there-
fore, the duration of the inspection; the cost of the
materials used therein; overheads such as the upkeep of
buildings, test equipment, fuel and energy; the salaries
of the personnel deployed for the checks. Impermissible
is, accordingly, a calculation based on the price or value
of the goods:37 these parameters have no influence on
the actual costs of the inspection.
The charging of a fixed rate is permissible, as long as it
is in keeping with the principle of proportionality.
Member States may, thus, demand a single price for the
performance of a specific task, no matter how long it
takes to perform that task in an individual case. Like-
wise, if calculation of the fee is by time spent on a given
job, Member States may round up to the full hour (or
another convenient unit of time).
Nevertheless, even in such cases of permissible generali-
sation, the ultimate fee must approximately reflect the
costs that the controls have occasioned. That makes a
cumulation of generalisations problematic. The necessa-
ry proximity is left behind, for instance, where a Mem-
ber State performs one and the same task simultaneous-
ly for several traders (the inspection of a combined con-
33. Solidarity fund (n6), para. 23; Lubrizol France (n22), para. 26.
34. Solidarity fund (n6), para. 39.
35. Bauhuis (n23), paras. 31, 36.
36. Case C-111/89 Bakker Hillegom, ECLI:EU:C:1990:177, para. 12; Solid-
arity fund (n6), para. 40.
37. Bakker Hillegom (n36), paras. 13, 14.
signment, say), rounds up the time taken and charges
the full amount to each of the traders.38
This has to be distinguished from the situation that con-
trols are merely permitted by EU law, rather than man-
datory under it: such optional controls have to be
financed out of general taxation, not by the traders.39 In
other words, Member States may charge traders for
such controls only if the payments demanded from trad-
ers constitute taxation as defined below.40
7 ‘On Imported/Exported
Goods for the Sole Reason
That They Cross a Frontier’
This element of the definition serves to delineate the
scope of application of Article 30 and Article 110
TFEU, respectively: there is no charge having equiva-
lent effect to a customs duty where the payment
demanded is part of a system of internal taxation under
Article 110.41
Charges having equivalent effect are characterised by
the fact that they one-sidedly encumber goods coming
from or going to other Member States, for the sole rea-
son that these goods have crossed, or are about to cross,
a frontier. The Court, in the name of a ‘general princi-
ple of freedom of transit of goods within the European
Union’, interprets Article 30 also to capture obligatory
payments due when a product enters into or leaves a
subdivision of a Member State from or for another such
subdivision.42
None of the national measures in issue in those cases,
however, drew a distinction between imports from other
regions of the same Member State, on the one hand, and
from other Member States, on the other hand; nor
between exports to other regions of the same Member
State and those to other Member States. It is therefore
not clear why it should not have been possible to deal
adequately with these situations under Article 110.
38. Out of hours-fees (n5), paras. 13-16.
39. Ligur Carni (n29), paras. 30, 31. In this respect, the Member States’
duty to abstain from demanding any payment from traders for ‘unilat-
eral’ controls goes further than their obligation under GATT (n9), which
allows such charges in Art. VIII(1)(a): ‘All fees and charges of whatever
character (other than import and export duties and other than taxes
within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in
connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount
to the approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an
indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports or
exports for fiscal purposes.’
40. Kortmann (n26), paras. 16-18.
41. Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig, ECLI:EU:C:1977:52, para. 27; Case
132/78 Denkavit Loire, ECLI:EU:C:1979:139, para. 7; Comission v.
Denmark (Groundnuts) (n26), para. 21; Case C-402/14 Viamar,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:830, para. 33; Lubrizol France (n22), para. 25.
42. For imports, see Case C-363/93 et al. Lancry, ECLI:EU:C:1994:315,
paras. 25-31; for exports, Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani, ECLI:EU:C:
2004:506, paras. 18, 22-26; Case C-293/02 Jersey Produce Marketing,
ECLI:EU:C:2006:403, paras. 62-64; for goods in transit, Gas pipelines
(n8), paras. 30-33; most recently Orgacom (n6), paras. 24, 25; Istanbul
Lojistik (n5), para. 42.
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There may well exist the general principle that the
Court has identified. Conspicuously, however, the
Treaty itself alludes to it in Article 36 TFEU (listing
grounds of justification for quantitative restrictions and
measures having equivalent effect),43 not in the provi-
sions concerning financial obstacles to trade. Despite
their differences, the provisions of Articles 30 and 110
are complementary to one another:44 crucially, that
means that there is no gap between them that needs fill-
ing in by the said general principle.
The concept of ‘taxation’ is wide: it encompasses all
financial dues that apply to categories of products
according to abstract criteria, that is, irrespective of the
destination (in case of exports) or origin (imports) of the
products.45 This is so even if there are no comparable
domestic products,46 never mind that the first paragraph
of Article 110 cannot apply to them in the absence of a
domestic equivalent (but instead the second paragraph
can).47 By contrast, the different repercussions of the
financial burden on different types of producers or trad-
ers are irrelevant. It does not matter, for instance, that
parallel traders, dealing in smaller quantities of a larger
number of different products, are hit harder by fixed
annual authorisation fees than ‘official’ distributors who
achieve high turnover with a small number of different
products.48 Likewise, it is immaterial if consumers ulti-
mately bear the charge.49
It is not clear, however, what the Court means by ‘cate-
gories’ of products to which a financial burden must
apply for it to be classified as a tax rather than as a
charge having equivalent effect. In a case in which a
Member State had imposed a charge on a group of
products comprising three types of nuts, it found that
such a limited number of products could not fall within
the concept of ‘whole classes of … products’.50 For that
to be the case, a ‘much larger number of products deter-
43. The Court pointed to the inclusion of transit in that provision in SIOT
(n12), para. 16.
44. See in and by n19, and also Statistical levy (n21), paras. 4, 5; Case
193/85 Co-Frutta, ECLI:EU:C:1987:210, para. 27; Case C-393/04 Air
Liquide, ECLI:EU:C:2006:403, para. 55; Essent Netwerk Noord (n4),
para. 40; Frohnleiten (n16), para. 30.
45. Denkavit Loire (n41), para. 7; Comission v. Denmark (Groundnuts)
(n26), para. 21; Diamantarbeiders (n19), paras. 19/21; most recently,
Orgacom (n6), para. 29; Lubrizol France (n22), para. 24.
46. Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht, ECLI:EU:C:1968:22, [1968] ECR Eng. Spec. Ed.
223, 231, 2nd para: ‘Article [110 TFEU] is intended to remove certain
restrictions on the free movement of goods. But to conclude that it pro-
hibits the imposition of any internal taxation on imported goods which
do not compete with domestic products would be to give it a scope
exceeding its purpose. Internal taxes, and turnover tax in particular, are
essentially fiscal in purpose. There is therefore no reason why certain
imported products should be given privileged treatment because they
do not compete with any domestic products capable of being protect-
ed’; likewise, Steinike & Weinlig (n41), para. 30; Case C-383/01
Danske Bilimportører, ECLI:EU:C:2003:352, para. 35; Kernkraftwerke
Lippe-Ems (n6), para. 90.
47. Danske Bilimportører (n46), para. 38; Viamar (n41), para. 36.
48. Kortmann (n26), paras. 27, 28.
49. Essent Netwerk Noord (n4), para. 49.
50. The Court in Steinike & Weinlig (n41), para. 30, spoke of ‘whole
classes of domestic or foreign products which are all in the same posi-
tion no matter what their origin’.
mined by general and objective criteria’ were required.51
That would leave the national court guessing, ‘how long
is a piece of string?’ The inclusion of domestic products
alone cannot be decisive, either. Otherwise imported
products would find themselves at a disadvantage, con-
trary to the case law just cited,52 simply because of the
happenstance that there is no domestic competing prod-
uct.
The question should rather be whether any products are
left out of the national categorisation although they
share the characteristic(s) that lead to the inclusion of
the few (in casu, the characteristic was the possible pres-
ence of a toxic pollutant). That characteristic must,
moreover, sufficiently distinguish that group from other
groups that raise similar concerns (with regard to
human health, for instance). In essence, this test is a
discrimination assessment. The same idea can also be
expressed in terms of proportionality, namely as the
question whether the differences between the products
that are included and those that are not are large enough
to warrant the difference in treatment.
The next question to ask in order to distinguish taxes
from charges having equivalent effect is whether the
same chargeable event, at the same marketing stage,
gives rise to the duty.53 If there is no domestic competi-
tion (because, say, a country has no car industry), the
question becomes whether the chargeable event took
place at all: for example, registration of cars, for which
Greece collected a charge on importation, even if the
cars were immediately re-exported to other Member
States rather than registered in Greece.54
Examples of unequal chargeable events are supply to the
consumer in the case of imports, but commencement of
use by the consumer in the case of domestic products;55
of different marketing stages, the slaughter of pigs in the
case of domestic products, and the marketing of lard in
the case of imports.56 Release onto the domestic market,
by contrast, marks the same event for domestic as well
as imported products: for the former, it occurs at the
factory gate; for the latter when they cross the border.57
Another example of the same event is the sale of goods
on the national territory, and the transfer to another
Member State of goods with a view to their sale, but not
their transfer to another Member State for a purpose
other than sale,58 say, for use in a foreign subsidiary.
The same event – withdrawal from the national herd or
release from national primary production – is the
51. Groundnuts (n26), para. 24.
52. See in and by n46.
53. Denkavit Loire (n41), para. 8; Mikhaïlidis (n8), para. 23; Case
C-234/99 Nygård, ECLI:EU:C:2002:244, para. 20; Petrotel-Lukoil
(n22), para. 24; Lubrizol France (n22), para. 39.
54. Viamar (n41), para. 45.
55. Case C-109/98 CRT, ECLI:EU:C:1999:199, paras. 13-15.
56. Denkavit Loire (n41), para. 8: Member States must not seek to equalise
burdens borne by domestic products at earlier stages of production or
marketing, such as the contributions paid by domestic producers for the
maintaining of hygiene standards in domestic abattoirs; Mikhaïlidis
(n8), para. 23.
57. Case C-68/96 Grundig Italiana (no.1), ECLI:EU:C:1998:299, paras. 15,
16.
58. Lubrizol France (n22), paras. 42, 43.
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slaughter of domestically reared animals and the expor-
tation of live animals.59
If the chargeable event and the marketing stage are the
same, it is a question for Article 110 whether the
amount to be paid is the same. The methods of calcula-
tion and collection must also be the same, unless it is
established that the charge to tax on the imported prod-
uct remains at all times the same as or lower than the
charge applicable to the similar domestic product.60 If
the tax is lawful in either of these cases, it does not mat-
ter that it is the producer who is subject to the financial
burden in the case of domestic products, while the trad-
ers have to bear it for imported products,61 nor that they
are payable to separate authorities.62 Charges levied in
the Member State of origin need not, however, be
deducted, cf. Article 111 TFEU.63
Even if the above conditions a)-d) for a charge to be
classified as taxation are fulfilled, the situation will still
be governed by Article 30 on two conditions. First, the
revenue of the tax is used to confer a measurable advant-
age on the (identical) domestic product when it is put on
the market.64 The benefit can be conferred indirectly, as
when the costs of past investments made by the domes-
tic producers are taken into consideration by the (quasi-
public) distributors when establishing the purchase
price, but these costs are already defrayed by the levy on
all products of that type, including imported.65 Second-
ly, the tax burden of the domestic product is offset in
total.66
Within the limits set for state aids by Articles 107 et
seqq. TFEU, it does not matter whether the benefits
accrue to the supply side (producers) or to the demand
side of the market (consumers). If consumers are the
beneficiaries, there must be a direct obligation or an
indirect enticement to buy domestic rather than impor-
ted products.
If, by contrast, consumers’ choice is free, the charge is
not incompatible with Article 30. If, say, computer
equipment for use in schools were the subject of such a
neutral incentive scheme, there might still be long-term
advantages to the national economy in the form of a
more productive workforce. Such advantages would not,
however, accrue specifically to the competing domestic
product at the time when it is put on the market but to a
59. Nygård (n53), paras. 28-30.
60. Case 127/75 Bobie, ECLI:EU:C:1976:95, para. 3.
61. Nygård (n53), para. 31 (producers/exporters); Orgacom (n6), para. 31,
where, however, in fact producers and importers were not at the same
marketing stage.
62. Case 132/80 United Foods, ECLI:EU:C:1981:87, para. 39; Nygård
(n53), para. 33.
63. Case C-72/92 Scharbatke, ECLI:EU:C:1993:858, paras. 14, 15; Nygård
(n53), paras. 37, 38; unclear Orgacom (n6), para. 36, where there had
been a tax reduction in the exporting country.
64. See, for example, Case C-517/04 Koornstra, ECLI:EU:C:2006:375,
paras. 18, 23-25: purchase by a (quasi-public) Dutch organisation of
shrimp sieves and peelers and their installation and maintenance,
financed by Dutch fishermen regardless of whether they landed and
processed their catch in the Netherlands, or in other Member States.
65. Essent Netwerk Noord (n4), para. 55 (electricity).
66. Scharbatke (n63), para. 10; Essent Netwerk Noord (n4), para. 42; Lubri-
zol France (n22), paras. 46, 47.
diffuse and diverse range of economic activities some-
time in the future.
For this comparison of the respective burdens and their
alleviation, the benefits bestowed on the domestic prod-
uct over the reference period (typically, the tax year)
must be translated into monetary figures, whether or
not these benefits were financial or intangible (such as
advertising by a national agency financed out of the rev-
enue of the dues).67 Any criteria other than financial
equivalents, such as the nature, scope or indispensable
character of those advantages, would not be sufficiently
objective.68 In the case of a total set-off, the levy has the
salient feature of customs duties and charges having
equivalent effect, namely that it targets specifically
imports or exports, to the exclusion of domestically
made products that are also marketed domestically.69 If
the tax is only partially offset, there will be discrimina-
tory taxation under Article 110, 1st paragraph instead.70
8 ‘Regardless of Its Mode of
Application, the Designation
of the Revenue From It, or
the Absence of a Protective
Effect’
The last element in the Court’s definition of a charge
having equivalent effect to a customs duty is meant to
forestall any attempts by the Member State at evading
the prohibition. This is why, in particular, the modali-
ties of the levying of the duty are irrelevant. More spe-
cifically, it does not matter whether a charge is demand-
ed at the frontier or is instead imposed following the
goods’ further delivery along the supply chain. The
duty can be levied at the frontier, or anywhere inland at
the wholesale or retail level of trade. What is decisive is
not when or where but why it is levied, namely with a
view to past importation or future exportation.71
67. See, for example, the advertising activities of the ‘Centrale Marketinga-
gentur für die deutsche Landwirtschaft’ (CMA) that were the subject-
matter of the proceedings in Case C-325/00 Commission v. Germany,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:633, para. 25.
68. Case C-28/96 Fricarnes, ECLI:EU:C:1997:412, para. 27; Case C-347/95
Facenda Pública v. UCAL, ECLI:EU:C:1997:411, para. 25.
69. Lubrizol France (n22), para. 37.
70. Joined Cases 78-83/90 Cie Commerciale del’Ouest ECLI:EU:C:
1992:118, para. 27: contributions by importers of petroleum fuels into
France to a French agency promoting energy savings and the rational
use of energy; Koornstra (n64), paras. 19, 20; most recently, Petrotel-
Lukoil (n22), para. 24. For the modalities of the reimbursement by the
Member State of the excessive part of the taxation, see Case C-255/00
Grundig Italiana (no.2), ECLI:EU:C:2002:525, paras. 33-41. Where a
company has not, in the form of higher prices, passed on to the con-
sumer the amount of the unlawful charge but has otherwise absorbed
the charge, although national law provided for such passing on, the
company can still demand reimbursement from the national authorities:
Petrotel-Lukoil (n22), paras. 32-37.
71. Case C-272/95 Deutsches Milch-Kontor (no.2), ECLI:EU:C:1997:191,
paras. 30, 31, 40.
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The designation of the revenue is equally immaterial,
but this question must not be confused with the above
proviso re tax set-offs. At issue here are uses of the sums
raised for purposes that are at first sight harmless, such
as for social or cultural concerns.72 If a levy meets the
criteria set out above, such benevolent purposes can still
not save it from the prohibition in Article 30. To say it
again, the Member States remain entirely free to finance
social, cultural, and any other policies out of general tax-
ation that is in keeping with Article 110. They must not,
however, draw on imports or exports alone to this end.
Likewise, it does not matter whether the Member State
uses the revenue for state aid. This is a question to be
assessed separately under Article 107 TFEU. The pro-
cedures to operationalise that provision are largely in the
hands of the Commission. This does not, however,
detract from the right of individuals to invoke the direct
effect of the prohibition in Article 30.73
Finally, because the financial burden on the free move-
ment of goods is decisive, no evidence of a decline in
trade is required.74 This has a parallel in Article 101(1)
TFEU: if an agreement, etc. has as its object (rather
than merely as its effect) the restriction of trade, the
Commission need not adduce evidence that such a
restriction has occurred in fact; instead, a restriction can
in those circumstances be present even where cross-bor-
der trade has increased.75
9 The Bigger Picture
It is easy to take for granted the abolition of customs
duties and charges having equivalent effect and the
establishment of a customs union between the Member
States. This early achievement has been in place for so
long that it was overshadowed, soon after, by the
unfolding of the other freedoms that is associated with
judgements like Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon, van Binsber-
gen, van Wesemael, Walrave, to which could be added
van Duyn, Ratti, Harz, Marshall, Francovich, and many
others from the 1970s to the 2010s. While the develop-
ments in these areas are ongoing and even accelerating,
the law regarding customs duties and charges having
equivalent effect is more or less still where it was by the
mid-1970s.
72. Diamantarbeiders (n19), paras. 11/14; Mikhaïlidis (n8), para. 17;
Orgacom (n6), para. 35; Lubrizol France (n22), para. 28.
73. Cie Commcerciale del’Ouest (n70), paras. 32, 33; Case C-17/91 Lor-
noy, ECLI:EU:C:1992:514, paras. 28, 29; Nygård (n53), paras. 53, 62.
74. Statistical levy (n21), paras. 6, 10.
75. Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten & Grundig v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, p341: ‘The fact that an agreement encourages an
increase, even a large one, in the volume of trade between states is not
sufficient to exclude the possibility that the agreement may ‘affect’ such
trade in the abovementioned manner’; p. 342: ‘For the purpose of
applying article [101(1)], there is no need to take account of the con-
crete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.’ The Court held like-
wise in Case 56/65 Société technique minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm,
ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, p. 249, last para.
Nevertheless, Articles 28-31 TFEU, as interpreted by
the Court, anticipated the deep penetration of EU law
into the law of the Member States that would become
even more apparent in these later developments. The
law on customs duties and charges having equivalent
effect has attracted much less political controversy than
the later developments in the area of free movement.
Maybe that is because it came first, when the Member
States and their public paid less attention or were more
accepting. All the same, this penetration was necessary
to remove as far as possible the ‘frontiers’, in the formu-
lation of Article 26(2) TFEU, that are in the way of the
free movement of goods. Any exceptions, any reserva-
tions for the Member States, translate into less free
trade.
Evidence for this proposition comes from the provisions
of GATT,76 to which reference has occasionally been
made above. The permissibility of charges for controls
adopted unilaterally by Member States is but one exam-
ple. To this can be added any other charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties (to borrow the lan-
guage of the Treaty), as long as they precede or coincide
with the release of a product onto the market. What is
more, while the charge may be insubstantial, its levying
will entail administrative burdens, and both hindrances
can accumulate, as the Court observed right from the
start of its jurisprudence.
The intrusion of another legal order into the domestic
law of the Member States is in this way the price of the
benefits that all derive from freer trade. The Member
States’ freedom to legislate as they please – their sover-
eignty – is partially (origin-neutral taxation always
remains legal) traded for a larger and more open market.
One might consider sovereignty and free trade incom-
mensurable: what price to put on legislative freedom?
Nevertheless, the question whether the trade-off is
worthwhile will arise, whether or not it can be answered
in exact figures, or only instinctively. It is safe to predict
that the experience of the UK after Brexit will provide
the Member States with clearer criteria to work this out,
each for itself.
10 Conclusion
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice regarding the
prohibition of customs duties and charges having equiv-
alent effect between Member States is well established.
The Court has held a steady line since the late 1960s,
which it continually refined in subsequent decades. Few
questions are controversial: one may wonder whether
the element of ‘consideration for services actually ren-
dered’ is an indispensable part of the assessment or
whether financial burdens occasioned by the crossing of
the lines between internal subdivisions of a Member
State ought to be assessed under Article 110 rather than
under Article 30. These are, however, side issues that
76. N9.
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are more of doctrinal interest than of practical relevance.
The creation and maintenance of a free trade area and a
customs union between Member States was successfully
accomplished and maintained.
The free movement of goods in its financial aspect was
thus the first of the four freedoms of the internal market
to be realised. Nevertheless, the internal market is about
to shrink in its geographical extent. The United
Kingdom left the EU on 31 January 2020, with the tran-
sition period under its Withdrawal Agreement ending
on 31 December 2020.77 It is comforting to reflect that
the provisions on the free movement of goods will retain
much of their relevance even after Brexit. No matter
whether there will eventually be a trade deal, once Brit-
ish goods have reached the market in one Member
State, they can from there be traded freely into any
other Member State, Article 28(2) and 29 TFEU. That
was the situation before the UK joined (which is when
the facts of Dassonville played).78 It will be true again
after the UK has left.
77. Art. 126 of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 29 of 31.1.2020, p. 7.
78. Reference in n17.
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